ABSTRACT
The author argues that a properly conceived version of liberalism offers an account of political institutions capable of supporting an agonistic ethos. Agonistic liberalism permits contending interpretations of the values shared by the public culture, constrained only by the limits of coherence. Rawls's contextualization of his theory of justice appeared in direct response to the accusations of the communitarian arguments of the 1980's. Rawls's understanding of justice remained relatively constant despite the shifting foundations of his theory; the theoretical content of justice retains its substance but the justification shifts radically. It is Rawls's commitment to stability, not his unwillingness to consider the contingency of foundations that makes political liberalism averse to conflict and eager to disguise the operations of social power. Rawlsian pluralism is structured to confine the range of interpretations of the very great principles so conflict occurs only on the implementation of these principles.
