ABSTRACT
Although previous case studies took into consideration the interaction between the ICTY and states, a discussion of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH)1 will introduce the question of compliance with ICTY orders in the context of a state under international military and civilian administration. The most extensive post-conflict state building project since the Second World War was undertaken in post-war BiH (Chandler 2005: 307), and the ICTY’s role in BiH cannot be viewed in isolation from this project. Because engagement with the ICTY occurred during an externally imposed process of post-war state building, this chapter will explore the question of compliance in the absence of a traditional Westphalian state and, as a result, will require an analytical framework which moves beyond dominant theories of IR that continue to rely on the state as an ontological given.2 Rather than being viewed as a state, BiH should be seen as an illustrative empirical example approaching Krasner’s concept of shared sovereignty (2004: 108). BiH remains formally sovereign as an international legal subject, yet at the same time has had its ability to act autonomously curtailed by external actors. Thus, even though Krasner suggests BiH is under a form of transitional administration (2004: 101-103),3 Krasner’s observation, “Foreigners have been running many of the ministries in Bosnia” (2004: 115) underlines the extent to state-centric approaches to IR are ill equipped to address the question of compliance in post-Dayton BiH.
