ABSTRACT
The simplest version of Non-Reductionism claims that a person is a separately existing entity, distinct from the person’s brain and body and their experiences. According to this view, among or in addition to the various parts that make up the psychophysical complex, there is some one part that constitutes the core or essence of the system.1 Since we tend to use ‘person’ to refer to the system as a whole, we may call this special part the self. But calling it a self rather than a person does not change the fact that the theory of the self is a theory about the person. This is shown by the fact that one often speaks of the self as ‘the true me’, thereby distinguishing it from those parts of the psychophysical complex that are seen as more peripheral or incidental to one’s existence as a person. Since most people believe in the self, the Reductionist would do well to start the defence of their position by trying to show why this view is false. But first we need to be clearer about just what a self might be like.
