ABSTRACT

At 08.30 on the 25th the British began to march round Sevastopol. Finding the bridge at the head of the harbour heavily fortified, the cavalry led the army along a narrow track. After colliding with Menshikov’s baggage train on the Batschi Serai road the British troops camped at the Traktir Bridge by the River Tchernaya, the French arrived late in the evening. Dundas, unaware of the army’s plans, could only suspect they were marching to Balaklava; Raglan had only requested he pick up the remaining Russian wounded at the Alma. By contrast Lyons was well informed, preparing to meet the army at Balaklava. 1 The following morning the British reached the small harbour, and Canrobert offered it, with the exposed right of the allied position, to Raglan. After consulting Lyons, Raglan accepted; he had only considered a brief operation, not a prolonged siege. The French moved across the Chersonese to use Kamiesch and Kazatch which, although less secure, were better suited to landing stores. Raglan and Lyons still favoured an immediate assault, but Canrobert, no more willing to send his troops against artillery than his predecessor, wanted to subdue the Russian guns with a heavy bombardment before storming the city. The engineers agreed: Burgoyne claimed an immediate assault would cost at least 500 killed. By the evening of the 27th the arduous work of landing the heavy guns had begun. Once again the grand raid had been deflected. After taking the risk of the flank march to turn weak defences on the north side, it was curious to halt before those of the south and watch while they were improved. Burgoyne was still very sanguine, but the nature of the campaign had changed, and this was first apparent afloat.