ABSTRACT
The conflict between Stratford and Dundas for control of the fleet during December 1853 reflected contrasting views of British policy. Stratford worked for a civilian/diplomatic solution to the crisis, using the squadron as an effective bargaining counter; Dundas looked to preserve his ships for a war which might open with an assault on Sevastopol. In correspondence the Ambassador adopted a tone of intellectual superiority which was both unjustified and offensive. Dundas fully understood the dominance of politics over strategy, and only required guidance on the policy objectives to control his fleet accordingly. However Stratford did not consider the senior seagoing officer in the Royal Navy capable of forming such judgements, preferring to make the decisions for him. Their relationship was not improved by the strict injunction to act in concert with their French colleagues. The Government intended that Stratford decide the policy, Dundas the method in which it should be conducted. Poor drafting of the instructions issued on 8 October gave Stratford some excuse for thinking he was the final arbiter on both points. The French instructions were similarly imprecise. This clash of wills was a problem peculiar to periods of armed diplomacy when neither peace nor war could claim primacy among the alternative methods of effecting Government policy. Stratford was Dundas’s nominal superior, but the Government never intended that he should order the fleet into the Euxine against the stated opinion of the Admiral. The division of blame was simple: Dundas obeyed the letter and spirit of his instructions, Stratford the letter only. He escaped censure because the ministers still hoped his efforts would secure peace, and because to do so would only make matters worse for Dundas. 1
