ABSTRACT
P. F. Strawson's contribution profoundly altered the philosophical landscape regarding contemporary work on free will and moral responsibility. One can easily identify in 'Freedom and Resentment' at least three distinct arguments for compatibilism. While each of these arguments merits attention, what makes Strawson's essay so important is not captured by attending just to the arguments themselves. It is, rather, the broader context into which these arguments fit. This context involves a conception of moral responsibility's nature that animates Strawson's arguments for compatibilism proper. Strawson chose an idiosyncratic set of terms to refer to the audience he meant to engage. His choice was, perhaps, unfortunate, since these terms: optimists, pessimists, and skeptics tend to confuse rather than illuminate, especially for newcomers to these philosophical issues. Strawson's arguments for compatibilism are built upon his conception of moral responsibility's nature. This conception arises from assumptions about the moral psychology of normally functioning adult human beings.
