ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the 'sub-personalist' view, where 'sub-personalist' designates the proposed kind of non-rational processes that cause emotional reactions. It tooks the accounts of Paul Griffiths, Jesse Prinz, Jenefer Robinson, Justin D'Arm, and Daniel Jacobson, to be the main representatives of this view. These accounts fail to provide the notion of salience required for the explanation of emotional reactions. Following Paul Ekman, Griffiths claims that the physiological and behavioral manifestation of an emotional episode, such as facial expressions, physiological feelings, involuntary bodily movements and also neurological and hormonal changes, unfold in an 'automated' way. A conceptualist about emotions, whether it is a judgmentalist or a seeing-as conceptualist, would say that such unawareness amounts to the lack of self-awareness of an intentional mental state. The extreme opacity of affective processes in the Zajonc experiments also indicates that these processes may operate or perhaps always operate entirely below the level of awareness.
