ABSTRACT
This chapter presents an account for emotional pathologies, which, much like the primal series accounts takes recourse to unconscious emotions. It draws on Freudian insights about distinctively non-rational imaginative capacities. The associative capacities more or less familiar from early Modern philosophy, in particular from the philosophy of David Hume. They are simple imaginative relations: similarity, inversion, part-whole and part-part. The associative processes of the imagination that the chapter relies on presuppose a few imaginative operations: the basic capacity of association, and the synthetic capacities of condensation, and displacement. Imaginative associations operate in a problematic second-personal space. Each individual association operates in this problematic second-personal space and it can, at least in principle, be brought to awareness or be called to attention, unlike the operations that cause reflex movement or the operations of mitochondria in cells. Verbal expressions or words or images also come to mind spontaneously, without deliberately directing our thoughts to them.
