ABSTRACT
The present study is devoted to a review of Soviet policy in the Middle East during the last decade and to an analysis of its future prospects. It also deals with developments inside the various Middle East countries in so far as they may influence the outcome of the struggle for the Middle East. It is in some ways a sequel to Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (1956), and The Soviet Union and the Middle East (1959). The shortcomings of these earlier books were, and are, obvious to the author. They were written at a time when little source material was available, and when it was just beginning to be realized that the topic itself was a legitimate subject of study. The general outlines of Soviet policy in the Middle East could be only dimly recognized at the time. Since then the situation has changed radically; as far as source material is concerned, the danger now is not of drought, but of drowning, and many new problems have appeared. In the nineteen-fifties Soviet relations with Iran and Turkey were much less complex than they are today; Soviet interest in Middle East oil barely existed, and there was virtually no Soviet interest in Cyprus, Sudan, Algeria, South Arabia, and a great many other places. There was no Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and, on a different level, hardly any Soviet writings on the Middle East; but as the area assumed growing importance in Soviet policy, so has the volume of literature expanded. I was tempted at times to bring my two earlier books up to date, but refrained for a number of good reasons. They summarized the early stages (the 'prehistory') of the Soviet drive towards the Middle East. It was not simply a question of continuing the historical narrative and adding fresh material; the whole perspective has changed. I believe that the basic assumption of these two earlier books was correct: the Soviet drive towards the Middle East was gathering momentum in the fifties; given the weakness of the area as a whole and the domestic situation in the Arab world, the Soviet Union had an excellent chance greatly to strengthen its position in the Middle East and perhaps even to become the dominant power there. These assumptions were by no means generally shared fifteen or even ten years ago. Soviet preoccupation with Europe was taken too much for granted, while the prospects of Nasserist Pan-Arabism as an independent political force were overrated.
