Conclusion

Why and how do RSIs undertake institutional change? This book’s central thesis originates with the argument that actual/expected changes in the regional distribution of power trigger institutional change. However, this structural factor is neither a sufficient condition nor a determinant of various types of institutional change. To satisfactorily explain this variance and this process, it is imperative to examine member states’ expectation of an RSI’s security utility, which is shaped by the RSI’s reference point, the ISP. The ISP is sticky, but it can be modified and replaced by the ideas proposed by INEs. The cases of ASEAN, ECOWAS, and the OAU/AU reveal that RSIs experience diverse institutional changes, but they also highlight that the theoretical model provided by the two-step process of institutional change depicts general causes and processes of the RSI changes. This model is useful to both the academic and policy worlds. Its academic contributions are threefold. First, the study shows that RSIs’ institutional change matters in shaping their regional security. Although this is not the central focus of the study, the cases observed the effect of RSIs on regional security dynamics. ASEAN has developed into East Asia’s leading multilateral institution. It has created inclusive cooperative security mechanisms such as the ARF, ASEAN + 3, the EAS, and the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meetings (ADMM) Plus. ECOWAS has played an imperative role in managing West African security as a nontraditional collective security mechanism. The OAU transformed itself into the AU and laid a legal and political infrastructure to manage internal conflicts on the African continent. Certainly, great power politics matter in shaping the global balance of power, and the global role of RSIs is generally limited because RSIs generally lack political and material power. However, the geographical proximity makes RSIs more influential in regions. The cases of ASEAN, ECOWAS, and the OAU/AU show that these RSIs attempted to maintain regional stability by attaining a certain security function. ASEAN expanded its geographic focus from the ASEAN region to Southeast Asia to East Asia, and it created several affiliated institutions that function as both political alignment vis-à-vis nonmember states and inclusive/exclusive cooperative security. ECOWAS and the AU established a nontraditional collective security mechanism to prevent and manage regional conflicts. Although these institutions were not

always effective in resolving conflicts, they have important security effects in the region. For example, ASEAN has maintained regional security stability for approximately five decades without a major war among members by concentrating on the protection of regional autonomy; ECOWAS ended and mitigated several internal conflicts in West Africa, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau; and the AU founded the regional political and legal infrastructure of conditional noninterference and played a mediating and peacekeeping role in regional conflict. RSIs are not the elixir for regional security, but they can exert security influence by promoting regime stability and changing regional states’ strategic calculation. In this sense, it is important to understand why and how RSIs change and what security objectives they have; identifying what these RSIs were, what they are, and what they would be. A theoretical framework without such an understanding would not only limit explanatory power but also mislead and create wrong expectations of the RSIs. Second, this study sheds light on the importance of the classification of security institutions. Security institutions are generally classified into three main categories, namely cooperative security, collective security, and collective self-defense. However, these concepts are not mutually exclusive. One case in point is ECOWAS, which assumed characteristics of cooperative security, collective security, and collective self-defense under the PMAD in 1981. The significance of the classification that accepts the multifunctionality of RSIs is that even if several functions are largely ineffective in the short term, some could become important factors in determining the future direction of institutional change and the institutional effectiveness in terms of political, legal, and even military aspects. For instance, although the PNA enabled ECOWAS to become regional cooperative security, it was the PMAD to which ECOWAS’s mediation committee first referred to establish ECOMOG in August 1990 because the PMAD created a nontraditional collective security and decisionmaking apparatus, regardless of how dysfunctional its operational and political basis was. Here, the fact that ECOWAS could legally function as nontraditional collective security under the PMAD was important. If the PMAD had not existed, it would have become more difficult for ECOWAS to establish such a peacekeeping force quickly. Therefore, the classification of multiple security arrangements is important to understand the possibility and limitation of their security functions. Third, this study sheds light on the limitations of mainstream IR theories in explicating institutional change in RSIs, and it provides a more nuanced theoretical framework based on an agent-centered historical institutionalism. Admittedly, there is an institutional continuity within RSIs, as explained by mainstream IR theories. Neorealism argues that common interests are an important factor to bind member states together. As institutionalism suggests, the reduction of transaction costs is an important element to explain institutional persistence. Social constructivism articulates that constitutive norms and rules become a source of member states’ collective identity and strengthen institutional continuity. However, because of their main focus on continuity, these theories pay

little attention to institutional change. The functionalities and security objectives of RSIs evolve, making them qualitatively different institutions. Incorporating the concepts of critical junctures and path dependence, the two-step process of institutional change in RSIs has more explanatory power because it explicates the interactive process of institutional continuity and change, discerning why, how, and when RSIs break institutional inertia. From a policy perspective, the study helps policymakers inside and outside RSIs better formulate their policy toward institutions. The cases show that institutional change in RSIs is influenced by the proposals of INEs. Because a change in the regional distribution of power opens a window of opportunity for RSIs to accept new ideas, it is a crucial period for policymakers to invest their time and resources into putting forward their proposals. Again, not all ideas can be accepted. RSIs’ ISP would not be completely canceled out by a strategic change, which constrains the range of choice that an RSI would have. The duration of a window of opportunity also depends on strategic instability in the region. Furthermore, these new ideas compete with each other and would likely be modified and compromised through internal discussions. In spite of these obstacles, the chance of accepting new ideas is higher during this time than during a period of institutional inertia and, once adopted, the core of the proposals is likely to remain. It is also important to reiterate that INEs are generally internal actors; member states are unlikely to accept norms and rules imposed by external actors, who might infringe regional autonomy. Nevertheless, external actors have some role in influencing institutional change in RSIs. They can propose ideas through discussions with member states and encourage member states to internalize the new proposals. With these academic and policy contributions, the theoretical model of the two-step process of institutional change helps understand the development of RSIs. As a recent test case, the model can be applied to the EAS, a relatively new institution in East Asia (it was created in 2005 by ASEAN). Its initial membership included regional states, namely Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, in addition to all ten ASEAN member states (ASEAN Secretariat 2005). Through internal discussions and debate, ASEAN agreed to create an inclusive cooperative security at the summit level in East Asia that was broader than ASEAN + 3 but not as expansive as the ARF. It was founded on the norm of ASEAN centrality, and ASEAN has the authority to set its agendas. However, its institutional objectives remained vague; although the original idea of EAS was proposed in 2002 by the East Asian Study Group, which aimed to upgrade the ASEAN + 3 framework, ASEAN decided to create EAS in parallel with ASEAN + 3 before clarifying its division of labor. Consequently, despite its premise to make the EAS a region’s “strategic” forum, its agenda has been adrift for several years (ASEAN Secretariat 2005). Instead, its initial focus became functional cooperation through five priority areas, on finance, education, energy, disaster management, and avian flu prevention (ASEAN Secretariat 2007).