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      Chapter

      The Philosophy of Moral Risk Emotions
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      Chapter

      The Philosophy of Moral Risk Emotions

      DOI link for The Philosophy of Moral Risk Emotions

      The Philosophy of Moral Risk Emotions book

      Toward a New Paradigm of Risk Emotions

      The Philosophy of Moral Risk Emotions

      DOI link for The Philosophy of Moral Risk Emotions

      The Philosophy of Moral Risk Emotions book

      Toward a New Paradigm of Risk Emotions
      BySabine Roeser
      BookRisk, Technology, and Moral Emotions

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      Edition 1st Edition
      First Published 2017
      Imprint Routledge
      Pages 30
      eBook ISBN 9781315627809
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      ABSTRACT

      This chapter proposes an alternative approach to risk emotions that is based on recent emotion research. The highly influential Dual Process Theory (DPT) sees emotions as irrational, unconscious states, which can serve as heuristics in decision making under uncertainty, but which are also highly prone to be biased. The opposition between reason and emotion also underlies the two dominant traditions in moral philosophy, namely sentimentalism and rationalism. The chapter discusses possible objections and alternative, non-doxastic interpretations of moral emotions and intuitions. Ethical intuitionists, like many philosophers and psychologists, believe that only rational judgments can track objective truths. Cognitive theories of emotions emphasize the importance of emotions when it comes to the appraisal of values. Several intuitionists have argued that assessing complex situations cannot be done in an additive way, as the way the features interplay is also important. They think that such holistic judgments are hence best understood as non-inferential or intuitive.

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