ABSTRACT
US-Tajik relations developed ‘considerably’ after September 11, according to the State Department. These include cooperation in such areas as ‘counternarcotics, counterterrorism, non-proliferation, and regional growth and stability’.1 Between FY 2001 and FY 2008, total US budgeted assistance for Tajikistan was around $540.35 million. This included: $61.57 million for ‘Economic Growth’ programmes; $78.02 million for ‘Governing Justly & Democratically’; $36.19 million for ‘Investing in People’; $120.31 million for ‘Peace & Security’; $216.43 million in humanitarian assistance; and $27.83 million for ‘Cross-Cutting & Program Support’.2 Congressional Research Service analyst Jim Nichol writes that after September 11, ‘Tajikistan seemed to be willing to cooperate with the United States, but hesitated to do so without permission from Moscow’. On 25 September 2001, the Tajik Defence Ministry gave permission to US forces to use Tajik airspace. US, French, and British personnel also used the Dushanbe airport for refuelling.3 A leaked US embassy cable from February 2010 noted that ‘there is some truth to the quip that Tajikistan’s real contribution to our efforts in Afghanistan is to be stable, and to allow unfettered over flight and transit to our forces – which the Tajiks have done unfailingly’.4 The document identified the following as key threats to Tajikistan’s development and stability: ‘Poverty, bad relations with Uzbekistan, intense corruption, Soviet-era economic structures and planning, an undemocratic political system, chronic food insecurity, and dependence on migrant labor in Russia’.5 Clearly, September 11 contributed to the internationalisation of Tajikistan’s domestic politics, with domestic threats to the country’s stability coming to be regarded as threats to the war on terror. In Washington, the influential belief in a connection between stability and democracy linked the war on terror with democracy promotion in Tajikistan. In 2001, Tajikistan was still recovering from a civil war that had lasted from 1992 until 1997. During the war, former Communist Party official Emomali Rahmon (known as ‘Rahmonov’ prior to 2007) had emerged as the country’s president and its leading politician. The Amer ican representative to Tajikistan between November 1998 and July 2001, Ambassador Robert Finn, recounted that the US regarded Rahmon ‘as who he was: this person who had won the civil war. He was a product of the Soviet Union, with what that implied’.6 Finn said that they ‘were trying to push [Rahmon] in the
right direction – more liberal, more open’. Rahmon was initially relatively cooperative, even on political reform, because he was ‘in a weak position. He was in the process of aggrandizing his position. And so on most issues he was happy to cooperate with us because it strengthened him as the president’. Finn ‘didn’t have particular problems’ with Rahmon until his third year, when the US embassy was trying to support ‘independent newspapers . . . and the government was not in favour of this. They were starting to feel their oats’.7 Rahmon’s increasingly confident and autocratic style of governance was reflected in Tajikistan’s Freedom House Democracy Score. The Score improved from 5.75 to 5.58 (out of 7) between 1999 and 2001. From that point on, the Score deteriorated for almost every year of the Bush presidency, reaching 6.07 in 2008 and 6.14 in 2009.8 The years after the end of the Tajik civil war saw Rahmon kill, exile, or imprison a substantial number of former United Tajik Opposition (UTO) leaders, as well as many of the warlords who had fought on Rahmon’s side during the war.9 The UTO had been formed in November 1994 by Tajik anti-government parties during peace talks aimed at ending the civil war. It included parties that represented regional interests (like La’li Badakhshan) and ones that were simply opposed to the government’s authoritarian and pro-Russian stance (like the Democratic Party of Tajikistan).10 Nonetheless, the ‘backbone’ of the organisation consisted of Islamists, including the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and the Movement for Islamic Revival in Tajikistan (MIRT). The UTO was headed by IRPT leader, Said Abdullo Nuri from 1994 until its disbandment in 2003. Its peace agreement with the government in 1997 ended the civil war. Under the agreement, 30 per cent of government posts were to be given to the Islamists and Nuri became head of a Commission on National Reconciliation. Stability eroded cooperation between the secularists and the Islamists. The IRPT’s partner parties dropped out of the UTO and the organisation ceased to exist in 2003.11 Shortly after the civil war, the Defense Ministry had around 3,000 former opposition members under its jurisdiction. In 2008, that number was down to 17 or 18.12 The year 2001 saw the assassinations of several influential UTO supporters: the Deputy Interior Minister Khabib Sanginov was shot in May; the head of the Khujand region (Ferghana Valley), Sobirjon Begjanov, was killed in July; the Presidential Advisor on Foreign Affairs, Karim Yuldashev, was assassinated in July as well; and the Minister of Culture, Abdurakhim Rakhimov, was killed in September.13 Rahmon’s betrayal of the peace agreement and slide into autocracy was also reflected in the country’s flawed elections. Western officials criticised Tajikistan’s 22 June 2003 constitutional referendum. It addressed 122 proposed changes to the constitution, including an article that allowed the president two seven-year terms in office.14 This let Rahmon extend his presidency. Officially, the turnout was 96 per cent, with 93 per cent voting in favour of the proposed changes. An OSCE statement noted that ‘the unusually high turnout . . . raised concern regarding the accuracy of the reporting and results’.15 The State Department reported that Tajikistan’s legislative elections in 2005 and presidential elections in 2006 were ‘considered to be flawed and unfair but peaceful’.16 The
February 2005 legislative elections were criticized by the OSCE for such ‘largescale irregularities’ as the presence of government officials on many electoral commissions, close government control of campaigning, ballot box stuffing, and doubtful ballot counting.17 After the March 2005 runoffs, Rahmon’s People’s Democratic Party secured 51 seats, the Communist Party five seats, the Islamic Renaissance Party two, and the independents five. An OSCE report described the 2006 presidential election campaign as ‘calm, peaceful and largely invisible’.18 Tajikistan did see some improvements in its economic conditions during the Bush years. Its Economic Freedom Score, as determined by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, rose by around 10 points (out of 100), moving the economy from ‘Repressed’ to ‘Mostly Unfree.’ Its Freedom from Corruption rating also rose by around 10 points, although it remained well within the ‘Repressed’ category.19
