ABSTRACT
Turkmenistan’s gas industry occupies a prominent place in its relationships with the US and with its neighbouring powers. This is because it is, by far, the leading gas exporter in Central Asia. Turkmen reserves rank sixth globally. They are estimated at 17.5 trillion cubic meters.1 In 2007, Turkmenistan was the sixth largest natural gas exporter in the world. Of its 54.3 billion cubic metres (bcm) in total exports, 48.1 bcm were sent to Russia and 6.2 bcm to Iran.2 The second half of the Bush presidency saw the Turkmen gas industry receive major boosts from new discoveries and from the change in political leadership.3 Most of the country’s gas came from the Dauletabad and Shatlyk fields. In addition to these, a supergiant South Yolotan-Osman field was discovered in the south-east in the mid-2000s. Another large field, called South Gutlyayak, was discovered in August 2008. As a newly independent state, Turkmenistan exported all of its gas to Russia via the Central Asia Centre (CAC) pipeline (Figure 5.1). In 1997, the Korpedzhe-Kurt Kai pipeline was completed, allowing for relatively small exports to Iran.4 A leaked February 2006 cable from the US embassy in Ashgabat described Amer ican policy in Turkmenistan as being focused on three key areas: promoting democratic reform and human rights; promoting security cooperation; and fostering economic reform and development, including the development of the country’s energy resources.5 The document noted that President Saparmurat Niyazov’s level of cooperation varied greatly across these areas. Specifically, ‘Niyazov barely . . . [paid] lip service to democratic or economic reform . . . [and was] interested in maximizing his profits from his hydrocarbon resources for his own personal projects . . . [however he cooperated] moderately well on security issues’. The Ashgabat embassy focused on encouraging the marginal improvements possible under the regime as well as conducting outreach and exchange programmes. The document argued that the embassy had succeeded in making ‘small strides in religious freedom’. The cable also reported limited successes in energy policy. It stated that, at the time, the embassy’s goal was ‘to prevent the . . . [government of Turkmenistan] from signing a long term or high volume deal with [the Russian government’s energy giant] GAZPROM which would reduce interest in’ the trans-Caspian pipeline and the trans-Afghanistan (the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India or TAPI) pipeline (Figure 5.1). It reported that
‘Embassy intervention just prior to Niyazov’s February 17 meeting with GAZPROM CEO Miller resulted in a two month reprieve’. While Niyazov continued to entertain the possibilities of trans-Afghan and trans-Caspian pipelines and sought Washington’s political and financial support for both projects, it was unclear to the diplomats whether he was serious or whether these discussions were just being used as a ‘bargaining chip with Russia’.6
