ABSTRACT
By the spring of 1982, dark and ominous clouds lay over Lebanon, as Israeli leaders hinted at a possible invasion to attempt, presumably, to destroy the SAM-6’s Syria had implanted in Lebanon, to crush the PLO (probably in alliance with the Lebanese ultras), and possibly to seize the headwaters of the Litani River. To counter this possibility, the United States exerted pressure in favor of maintaining the July 1981 cease-fire and sent Philip Habib back to the area to mediate in February 1982; the U.N. Security Council, in this same month, voted to increase the UNIFIL force by one thousand to help patrol the gap between its troops around Beaufort Castle. Some observers believed that only the soggy winter soil and pressure from the United States not to prejudice the final evacuation of the Sinai, which took place on April 25, had prevented Israel so far from invading. The Sinai was evacuated without a hitch, and as the ground hardened in spring, the moment was favorable for the Israelis to strike. The Arab world was sharply divided, with Egypt out of the running for the time being, Syria suffering from internal turmoil, Syria and Iraq at loggerheads, and Iraq involved in war with Iran; a world oil glut made the use of the oil weapon less probable; the USSR was involved with its own problems in Afghanistan and Poland; and a sympathetic president and secretary of state held power in the United States. Whether Israel, implicitly or explicitly, received the green light from the United States, as of course the USSR maintains, remains to be determined. But it is clear that while it was believed that Israel intended only to clear a 25-mile (40-kilometer) area north of its border—to bring “Peace to Galilee”—the U.S. government did seem to lend support and to see the invasion as a new “opportunity” to realize some sort of overall solution.
