ABSTRACT
This chapter explains the respective balances of coercive control and institutional support between regimes and dissidents. Dissidents and regimes have coercive control to the extent that they can obtain consistent compliance with their demands and directives through the threat of negative sanctions. Regimes may see little benefit in controlling nomads or tribal groups in remote regions who neither pose a security threat nor promise tax revenues. Major determinants of dissident coercive control differ substantially from those of regime control, in part because some variable conditions of regime control tend to be invariant for dissidents. Their coercive control, and their institutional support, is nevertheless greatly facilitated if they exercise administrative control in some rural regions or population centers. Dissident coercive control varies moderately with the proportion of a population subject to their regular surveillance and deterrence. Conspiratorial activity thus is likely if the coercive balance strongly favors either the regime or the dissidents, but not if the coercive balance approaches equilibrium.
