ABSTRACT
Somalia https://s3-euw1-ap-pe-df-pch-content-public-p.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/9781315637631/0dfd750b-31b3-40f5-9e68-14ffce6d9f0c/content/fig2_1_C.jpg" xmlns:xlink="https://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"/> Source: Somalia, Map No. 3690 Rev. 10, United Nations, December 2011. Reproduced with permission. In the space of a year, 1992–1993, three peace operations were undertaken in Somalia under various commands as well as under various Chapters of the United Nations’ Charter (6 and 7): United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), Restore Hope/United [Nations International] Task Force (UNITAF) and United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). UNOSOM I was launched under Chapter 6, which limits the use of force to self-defence. Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II took place under the aegis of Chapter 7, authorizing the use of coercive force. Somalia is one of the key cases of this book as the outcomes of the peace operations do not follow a chronological order. A failed peace operation was followed by a successful one and ended with a partially failed one. This chapter presents the initial setting and process of each mission, detailing the type of intervener and the choice of strategy. Considerations of strategy will look at three key components: communication, capacity and knowledge of the actors. I then present the outcomes of each mission and the extent to which the type of intervener and strategy matter in the re-establishment of order and the accomplishment of mandate.
