ABSTRACT
The developmental tendencies of particular civilizations or political bodies were consistently scrutinized by philosophers and historians long before the emergence of the philosophy of history. The main concern of the philosophy of history is, however, a wholly different problem, namely the cognitive establishment of a developmental scheme in ‘History’ (with a capital H) as a whole. All theories of development, be they particularistic or universalistic, have to arrange all events and structures understood by them as elements of one and the same social process, and have to evaluate them according to the ‘place’ they occupy in the temporal sequence, that is to say, in the life of the social entity in question. If one reconstructs the life of the social entity called ‘ancient Rome’, one has to ‘cut out’ events and structures which can be grasped as belonging to ‘Rome’, in order to establish a developmental scheme of ‘Rome’. In this case, the ‘one and the same social process’ (Rome) is grasped as a continuity, and the developmen tal sequences of events and structures have to be understood as discontinuous stages of this very continuity. These stages are equally amenable to evaluation as periods of progress, as golden ages, as decline, and the like, and as the sequence of stages interpreted as a chain of changes following an internal developmental tendency. The philosophy of history uses the same method: all the same, it does not apply it to one or another particular civilization or political body, but to ‘History’ as a whole. In so doing, however, it has to construct a ‘unit’ which cannot be cut out of human structures or events because it encompasses all human structures and events. The ‘unit’ so chosen is not a ‘closed’ but an open one, and its logic cannot be reconstructed from its end result since this result is not yet given. As a consequence, the logic inherent in the ‘unit’ cannot be reconstructed at all, it is (and remains) unknown. And this is why philosophies of history, in order 224
to be consistent, have to include the future in the logic of their unit as well, as if it were (or could be) known. The developmental logic has to be established from assumed knowledge of the future. In this regard, it does not matter whether the philosophy of history operates with a strong or a weak argument. It can suggest: this will be the future, because this will be the outcome of the logic of ‘History’; or it can suggest: if there is any future, this is what it will be like. The alternative formulation (either-or), the permissive formulation (if-th en), and the apodictic formulation (of necessity) do not differ on this main point: they all suggest the acceptance of a developmental logic inherent in the undertaking called the life of humankind. Thus the philosophy of history, in order to grasp ‘History’ as a unit, a continuity characterized by one logic, one developmental tendency, is compelled to arrange all human cultures in one single line, and evaluate these different cultures according to the place they supposed ly occupied in the life of humanity. The application of the same method to particular entities and to ‘History’ as a whole leads to completely different theoretical consequences. As Barraclough put it, ‘It is one thing to talk of progress of one civilization, another to talk of progress from one civilization to another - by which we affirm that the spirit of one civilization is more “advanced”.’* One only has to add this: even if no civilization is considered as ‘more advanced’ than others, the arrangement o f all civilizations is nevertheless accom plished in exactly the same way. When Ranke stated that every civilization is equally close to God, he was also making a statement regarding ‘History’ with a capital H (history as a whole), and equally arranged all civilizations in a circle (around God). He assumed that the future, too, will again be another link in that same chain (or circle), and a link not better or worse than the anterior ones, but one equally close to God. It has to be added that the older Ranke changed his mind in this regard, and viewed the future as a progressive period (in a permissive way).
