ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses how the member states of international organizations control international secretariats in the area of military affairs. It uses the principal-agent model, which is a natural framework for questions of agency and control. The chapter examines principal-agent problems within international organizations relating to military affairs, it is worthwhile first to explain why states cooperate 'through' formal international organizations in military operations. It focuses on the combination of goal conflicts and informational asymmetries that allow secretariats influence. The chapter also examines how secretariat agency can be used and captured by individual or groups of member states. It discusses the mechanisms that states use to exert control over the secretariats. The chapter focuses on three mechanisms: the non-delegation of critical functions, the use of indirect generic rules, and the establishment of shadow bureaucracies, which allow states direct oversight. It considers three strategies that member states can use to reduce agency costs through collective and unilateral control mechanisms.
