ABSTRACT
Ethical-political discourses as instances of public deliberation As we search for a solution to our problem, namely, how can minority claims gain public recognition in spite of cultural differences, I would like to explore the possibilities provided by the most emblematic feature of the model of deliberative democracy – proceduralism. While this may also be one of the more controversial features of the model (see Cohen 1994; Kirshner 2010; Gledhill 2011), I do not wish to address proceduralism as such, but rather investigate it as an instrument capable of resolving the issue at hand. For this reason, I will focus on the proceduralist answer to the question, “What is the criterion for the public legitimacy of a collective decision?” The answer from the proceduralist perspective is that all individuals and groups who may be affected by the decision in question, whether it concerns the approval of a norm, policy, or the like (see Benhabib 1996; Cohen 1997; Bohman 2000), must give their consent. This may at first seem to be an analytic statement, but the non-trivial elements of the theory, as pointed out in Chapter 5, concern the requirements for the procedure through which such consent is obtained. Specifically, the discussion leading to the decision must conform with certain criteria which guarantee that the consent is genuine and not a result of factors such as fear, momentary emotion, or blind trust in somebody else’s opinion. If the decision is made in a procedurally correct way then it should be in the equal interest of all persons affected – not in the sense that someone else decides that this is the case, but because those affected themselves accept the outcome of the deliberation. Moreover, they do this as responsible people who are fully aware of their actions, not simply because they just happen to agree. As was stated above, the following four criteria for such agreement stand out from those discussed within the theory of public deliberation: freedom from coercion, rationality, equal standing of the interlocutors, and openness of the communication. Of course, some of the participants in procedurally correct public deliberations, and perhaps even all, might be wrong in agreeing upon a certain decision. Some or all of them might have insufficient or false information concerning the situation, be guided by assumptions and values that they might subsequently
reconsider, and so forth. The decision might turn out to be in fact unjust in regard to the interests of some of the parties involved. It might, also, lead to consequences that are at odds with the intentions of the participants. However, its procedural correctness also presupposes its revisability if someone presents ample argumentation for a change. In this sense, the decision would be legitimate insofar as it is procedurally correct, rather than for substantive reasons. For example, the decision reached might, in fact, not be conducive for realizing a specific ideal concerning what is good for the community or for attaining some other concrete goal, but it may still be legitimate if it has been produced by “undistorted” (in Habermas’s sense) public communication. However, this does not mean that an ethical-political discourse whose subject-matter concerns the common good of a group cannot be procedurally correct provided that all the deliberative criteria are met. Let us now presume that all of these criteria have been met by an ethicalpolitical discourse within a minority group – a discourse that addresses its cultural needs, as well as the respective claims for legal norms and public policies that would be advanced from its side into the public sphere. In other words, let us presume that this ethical-political discourse is a procedurally correct instance of public deliberation. In this case, cultural “intransparency” should not prevent the general public from evaluating the legitimacy of a minority’s cultural claims because one would not need to make any judgments about the substance of the argumentation that shapes the collective awareness of the group’s members concerning their cultural needs. One would not have to share the cultural attitudes and beliefs of the members of the group in question because only the procedural correctness of the deliberations within the group – the deliberations that produced the collective decision to present these particular claims and no others – is what matters for evaluating the legitimacy of the claims presented. Furthermore, the risk of strategic manipulation within the group would also be minimized because, if the criteria for deliberation are met, the members of the group who are not involved in an attempt at manipulation would have every opportunity to expose it through criticism based on convincing argumentation. The same is also valid concerning possible power struggles within the group since freedom from coercion and recognition of the “force” of the better argument are among the most important criteria for public deliberation. In addition, insofar as “false consciousness” is concerned, rational and free debate among equals provides opportunities to foster sound self-reflection among the participants. Finally, the representativeness of the claims put forward would be guaranteed by a procedurally correct public deliberation since every voice will be heard in a discussion that meets the deliberative criteria. It thus appears that as far as the realm of models, ideals, and hypotheses is concerned, we have found an answer to the question, “How can cultural minority claims obtain public recognition?” While it may not be the only plausible resolution, it is, in my opinion, the one that best fits the frame of reference in respect to the Habermasian model of deliberative democracy. That is to say that if the
claims put forward are the outcome of an ethical-political discourse within the respective minority group that meets the procedural criteria of public deliberation, then they should be regarded as legitimate by the general public, as well. Culture-specific attitudes and beliefs, strategic intra-group machinations, false consciousness of some or all group members, and so forth, cannot hinder the empirical evaluation of the procedural correctness of an intra-group discussion by the public at large. Rationality, freedom from coercion, equality of the interlocutors, and openness to all who can convince the others that they are, or could be, affected by the decision being discussed, and so forth, are all parameters of the procedural correctness of intra-group deliberation that are universally accessible.1 Is such a model of public legitimization of minority claims feasible, though? In order to demonstrate that it is not one of the so-called counterfactual normative conceptions, I will briefly examine two case studies of intra-group discussions that largely meet the criteria for ethical-political discourses. One is presented by Mohammed el-Nawawy and Sahar Khamis (2010) in their article, “Collective Identity in the Virtual Islamic Public Sphere. Contemporary Discourses in Two Islamic Websites.” It is a review of the discussions conducted on the websites Islamonline.net and Islamway.com, which are described by the two authors as “popular” and “mainstream” for the Muslim public (see ibid., 230). What gives me reason to claim that the discussions in question meet Habermas’s criteria for ethical-political discourses? As el-Nawawy and Khamis (2010, 230) note, the two websites provide “a platform for argumentation, debate and exchange of ideas between the various participants around issues of common concern, as well as spreading knowledge and awareness of the Islamic faith.” Furthermore, they expressly point out that these discussions contribute to “shaping the subjectivities and identities of current and future Muslim generations” (ibid.). The two authors definitely take a constructionist approach to identity. Although many of the discussions on the two websites are about what it means to be a true Muslim, how a true Muslim should behave in particular situations, and how the participants are looking for answers to these sorts of questions in Islamic scripture, el-Nawawy and Khamis do not view these discussions as an attempt to reveal or rediscover the enduring objective essence of “Muslimness” but, rather, as a process of the reproduction of Muslim identity over time:
We perceive the process of collective identity formulation as a flexible and intersecting process of self-definition and self-representation, which is shared by a group of people, who inhabit similar or overlapping identity positions and identity-related discourses.
