ABSTRACT
Deradicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation, or reintegration programs have regularly been described within the realm of counter-terrorism policies and strategies (e.g., Boucek, 2008; Dechesne, 2011; El-Said, 2015; Gunaratna & Bin Ali, 2015). Many deradicalization programs in the Middle East and Southeast Asia have been constructed with the deliberate goal of gaining specific intelligence for counter-terrorism operations, oftentimes with the direct involvement of security agencies in the program itself-for example, in Singapore or Malaysia (El-Said, 2015, p. 169; Harrigan, 2012). Recently established programs in Western countries-especially since the heightened perception of security threats posed by returning foreign fighters or homegrown radicalization inspired by groups like Islamic State-have also been more and more tied to security agencies or gained intelligence gathering components, such as, for example, in Denmark with the “Aarhus” program, which is located within the police (Agerschou, 2014), or the French family counseling hotline run by the Ministry of the Interior’s Coordination Unit for Counter-Terrorism (Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste, UCLAT) (Hellmuth, 2015a, 2015b). While the specific intelligence value of captured terrorists as a ‘side product’ of deradicalization programs has been marginally discussed (Susan, 2012), there has been no detailed theoretical or practical exploration of how deradicalization programs can be included in counter-terrorism strategies and what effects can be seen, as well as expected, from such programs in that field. This chapter will provide a first theoretical account of deradicalization programs’ counter-terrorism effects in combination with an assessment of the available knowledge from practice. Although the very nature of deradicalization and disengagement programs include the prevention of terrorist offenders’ return to armed struggle, which in itself would be a strong counter-terrorism effect, these programs do yield additional benefits in that field-at least theoretically. However, one of the most problematic aspects of modern deradicalization programs is the widespread tendency of ‘securitization,’ meaning the shift to include DDPs as part of security agencies’ responsibilities, with police or intelligence officers as case managers, or establishing rehabilitation programs with the specific goal of intelligence gathering. This
‘securitization’ process might be understandable-especially if individual cases of highly violent offenders participate in the program-but are nevertheless inherently risky for the overall success and credibility of deradicalization programs. First of all, it has been shown that the level of cooperation with security agencies-in regard to specific information provided-has the direct effect of potentially violent repercussions against the defector (Koehler, 2015a). Being seen as ‘traitors’ increases the risk of lethal retaliation from the former group against the program participant or his/her family, which could create further risks of radicalization and recruitment to terrorist groups in the community. Second, if the potential participants feel expected to provide intelligence to their former enemies, this might create strong psychological barriers against defection and even backfire, when perceived by the individuals and their groups as just another method of warfare against their own. In this way, strongly securitized deradicalization programs have the risk of increasing radicalization processes. Third, these mechanisms might substantially raise the difficulty level for long-term successful reintegration, if the program graduate aims to re-enter normal life. Family or community members, former friends, colleagues, and other ‘relevant others’ might see the cooperation of the graduate with the authorities as weakness, betrayal, or even a cause for suspicion (e.g., seeing the person as a potential spy from the government). As a fourth negative consequence of highly securitized deradicalization programs, there is strong reason to believe that attractiveness and success might be severely limited with the highly radicalized core members of terrorist groups. Paradoxically, the focus on security and intelligence gathering might be one important reason behind many programs’ failure to successfully engage with these group leaders in the center of the designated security threat-for example, in Saudi Arabia (al-Hadlaq, 2015, p. 37) or Singapore (Ramakrishna, 2014, p. 204). Hence, one needs to be careful not to follow the oftentimes reasonable conclusion to include deradicalization programs in the security agencies’ led counter-terrorism operations, in order to avoid losing credibility and operational flexibility with the main target group of potential clients. In consequence, a diverse and dynamic network of different types of deradicalization programs run by different actors, which are strategically and conceptually sound and connected to each other, has delivered the most promising results so far regarding the adequate case referral according to responsibilities, without the general dismissal of deradicalization policies as government-led forms of psychological warfare.
