ABSTRACT
Association psychology had a difficult problem to explain how the desired outer movement could follow from the volitional act which was dissolved in the images or feelings. Experimental investigations showed that we can scarcely imagine a palpable object, or even a movement, without carrying out entirely unconscious movements which correspond to the imaged object. We may say, therefore, that each image has a tendency to call forth a movement, or even to realize the object which it refers to. The problem, then, is not to find out that a movement follows the goal image, but rather to find out why a movement does not appear with each image. However, all cases of a movement initiated by an image (ideomotor) presuppose previous practice in this movement. An image has the tendency to call forth such a movement again, only if the image has been frequently followed by the movement. This is, consequently, only a special case of the general law of association. Most remarkable results can also be derived from this standpoint: First of all, the existing volitional act would really be utterly meaningless. Then the inner connection between image and action must be explained. This has been interpreted on the basis of an association by similarity. But wherein does the similarity of the two exist? Certainly not in their psychological nature, for the image of a movement is something very different from the movement itself. There remains, therefore, only a similarity between the content, the meaning of the image, and the activity. But quite apart from this objection, the fact that the law of association by similarity cannot be understood in this way, raises a new difficulty; namely, why does not each meaning lead to the realization of this meaning? Why cannot certain very simple movements be made when the will is resolute and the movement apparatus is uninjured — the voluntary movement of the ears, for example? In this case only the assumption of a previously planned connection between images and movements would remain possible, by which the scientific explanation would certainly have achieved its end. However, the above-mentioned fact, that many men, in spite of the best volition, are not able to execute certain movements for which they are qualified, proves, on the other hand, that volitional activity cannot be explained merely by pointing to the existing volitional intention.
