ABSTRACT

For many years it has been acknowledged that France had long experience with democratic institutions, that it possessed the requisite socioeconomic infrastructure necessary for a stable democracy, 1 and that it was a “modern” country. 2 Yet there was a feeling, shared by American and some French political scientists, that French democracy was not fully “consolidated”—that for a sizable number of citizens it was not “the only game in town.” 3 This state of affairs was attributed not only to faults in institutional arrangements but also to flaws in the French national character. Until recently, discussions of the problems faced by France emphasized a number of political culture traits blamed for recurrent revolutions, legitimacy crises, and decision-making blockages. Social scientists pointed to the prevalence of class distrust; the absence of civic-mindedness (incivisme), manifested in hostility toward the state and its representatives; an underdeveloped ethos of participation in public affairs; and a tendency to express everything in terms of ideology, most often a leftist one. 4 Some scholars even spoke of a “delinquent society” that made incessant demands on the state for benefits but refused to accept the necessary social and political obligations. 5 These characterizations have almost always proceeded from the vantage point of an ideal type of political culture—one marked by pragmatism, a pro-system orientation, social trust, an ethos of participation in political life, and a high degree of civic responsibility.