ABSTRACT
It shall become evident later that the cause by which the object of knowledge becomes known (ma‘lūm) is due to its ability to separate form and essence from its substratum (māja) 1 Likewise, the cause of a thing’s knowing is that its being does not subsist in its substratum. Whenever a being abstracted (mujarrad) from the substratum is a form, that being is knowable by being abstracted from the substratum. The form of humanity is such that when it is abstracted from the substratum of humanity, it is knowledge as it subsists in man’s soul (andar nafs). A soul (nafs), moreover, whose form is abstracted from substratum exists sufficiently due to itself. Hence, due to its own self the soul itself is a knower because as a knower it is independent of the substratum, as we shall make evident when it is proper to do so. It is the knower of a thing which is not separated from it but which comes to the soul. That which is independent of the soul is known to that which is not separated from it. The soul cannot be separated from itself. In relation to itself, therefore, it is both a knower and a known. The Necessary Existent is independent of substratum in being absolutely separated from it. But Its essence is neither hidden from (maḥjūb) Itself nor separated from Itself. 2 Accordingly, It is a knower known to Itself. Indeed, It is knowledge (‘ilm) Itself. 3 Among entities which are abstractions is that whose essence is known by that with which it is united. Since it is an independent entity which is not separated from itself, it is a knower and a known by itself. As a matter of fact, that which is known is knowledge. A known for us is that form (i.e. that concept) which subsists in us, rather than that which is its form. A thing which is known exists otherwise than in reality. The sensible (maḥsūs) is that effect which arises from our perception (āthār) of it, not that external reality whose result is sensation. Thus, in reality, what is known is knowledge itself. Since that which is known to the soul is a knower, knower, the known, and knowledge are identical in this context. The Necessary Existent is, therefore, a knower of Its own essence ( dhāt). Its essence is the existentiator (hastī dah) of things according to the order in which they exist. Hence, Its essence, the existentiator of all things, is known to It. All things are known to It, then, due to Its own essence. It does not become a knower of things because It is caused by them, but on the contrary, Its knowledge is the cause for the existence of all things. Similar to such knowledge is the (scientific) knowledge of the builder (ditrūdgar) with regard to the form of the house he has conceived. His conception of the form of the house is the cause of this form in the external reality, which is the cause of the builder’s knowledge. But the form of the heavens (āsmān) is the cause of the form of our knowledge because the heavens exist. 4 For this reason, the agreement of all things with the first science (‘ilm-i awwal), the agreement of things which we realize in thought and in knowledge because their external form is due to that form which is in our knowledge.
