ABSTRACT
It is known and well recognized among people that he is able (tawānā) who can act (kunad) when he is so inclined. He is not able who simultaneously wishes ( khwāhad) to act and to abstain from performing an act. It is ordinarily stated that there are acts of which the Creator is capable, although He neither wishes nor ever performs them, such as an act of injustice. Accordingly, the condition on the basis of which He acts depends not on the categorical syllogism (ĥamlī) but on the hypothetical syllogism ( sharṭī). If He wishes to act, therefore, He will act. And if He does not wish to act, He will not act. In order that the conditional judgment may be true it is not required that both conditions should be correct. Both, in fact, may be false (durūgh ). For example, it is said, ‘If a man flies, he moves in the sky,’ which may be true, while both the hypothesis and the consequence are false. The hypothesis could be false while the consequence is correct, as in the following case: ‘If a man were a bird, he would be an animal’. Consequently, it is correct to state that the saying, ‘If it does not desire, it does not act’, does not necessarily imply that the saying ‘it does not desire’ because ‘it does not act’ could be true, for it is possible that the statement’ it desires and it acts’ may be the case. If it does not desire anything, and it is suitable for it to feel no desire, then it is true that it will not act. However, if it does desire something, and it is suitable for it to desire something, then it is true that it will act. 1
