The primary analysis of the nature (ḥāl) of being (hastī), its application to numerous things (uftādan), and an introduction to the exposition of substance

Being (hastī) is recognized (bashināsad) by reason itself ( khirad khwud) without the aid of definition (ḥadd) or description (rasm). Since it has no definition, it has neither genus (jins) nor differentia (faṣl) because nothing is more general (’āmmtar) than it. ¹ Being does not have a description since nothing is better known (ma’rūf) than it. It is possible that one can recognize its name in one language by means of another language. Thus, by some means, it is possible to acquaint someone with what is meant by a term like being. For example, if being appears in Arabic, it can be explained in Persian, and one can indicate (ishārat) that it is that from which all other things are derived.