ABSTRACT
It is known that there must be a cause for whatever is made anew or changed. In our forthcoming discourse it will become evident that these causes which lie in the past are endless in number. Whenever a cause is realized (maujud sbuwad) due to an act, it is known that that exists which is the cause of its cause. Therefore, when something does not exist and when its cause is not actualized, then a cause either (1) does not exist due to an act, or (2) it exists although it is fundamentally not the cause of an existence, or (3) it exists not as a cause but as a condition which must be realized in order that it may become a cause, for such a condition is similar to the cause. Consequently, there must be a cause for that condition which is similarly unlimited in number, for it is impossible for a series of causes to be concurrently at one place (yak jāy) and to exist without a limit (bīnahāyat). Causes must, therefore, be ordered according to priority (pīsh ) and posteriority (sipas). But here a doubt should be raised. Let us assume that the time posterior to any cause is indivisible (nāmunqasim). Time must be composed of indivisible entities, for otherwise one unit of time would not be connected to another, and there would be spans of time between their intervals. If they were not connected, however, would they be causes of each other ? On the other hand, if time were divisible, why would this cause exist for a period of time, producing (az wai biyāyad) an effect only at the end, rather than at the beginning (awwal hamī nayāmad)?
