ABSTRACT
Combined arms operations, what Steven Biddle has called the modern system of force employment, emerged during the last century. Those who master combined arms operations generally achieve victory in war, while those who ignore it or concentrate on a single dimension of combat operations generally go down in defeat.1 The mastery of combined arms operations, however, is no simple matter. Organizational culture and bureaucratic preferences can impede the integration of forces and operations. The quest for quality and professionalism remains a constant struggle; it is often easier to preserve the appearance rather than substance of com - petence in peacetime when the only true test of a military is battle itself. Serious militaries also must constantly work to integrate new technologies, weapons, and operations into the most effective combinations to maximize combat synergies. And even the most exquisitely conceived and brilliantly executed combined arms operations can fail if they are not tied to strategic realities and plausible political objectives.2
