ABSTRACT
The army that crossed the Hellespont in 334 saluted its young king with admiration and enthusiasm. He had just hurled his spear into Asian soil, and then leapt ashore to embark on a war of conquest that would change the history of the world. But, from the top down, this was still very much the army of Philip II, its leaders chosen from the firmly entrenched aristocratic families of Makedon. Two years earlier, their loyalty to the son was in doubt: challenging his right to the throne, a powerful faction might, if it chose, reassert the claims of Amyntas son of Perdikkas III who, in the face of a national crisis, had been swept aside in favor of Philip. Yet, for Alexander, Philip’s assassination could scarcely have occurred at a better time, with both Parmenion and Attalos absent in Asia Minor; with them was at least one member of the Lynkestian royal house, and other magnates whose influence at Court translated into power within the army—though perhaps the reverse was true. Antipatros, for reasons that may have had more to do with faction than devotion to Alexander, engineered the prince’s accession, despite being the father-in-law of Alexandros Lynkestes, brother of the suspected regicides. Arrhabaios and Heromenes were arrested and summarily executed as confidants of the assassin, Pausanias. In truth they posed a greater threat to the new king than the old one. Some of their relatives and adherents preferred to share the fortunes of the Great King and his Greek supporters. Amyntas Perdikka was resigned to his fate; at least his most loyal supporters had time to flee. But, whether in the name of justice, filial piety, or security, it was neither in Alexander’s power nor to his advantage to conduct a full-scale purge: for the military aristocracy was a many-headed hydra, and each regeneration threatened greater dangers. He would have to make his peace with the “Old Guard.”
