ABSTRACT
This chapter uses the term 'Peloponnesian War' in its traditional sense, but for the sake of accuracy people must beware of its monolithic implication for the sake of convenience. It suggests that Sparta applied a similar policy during the Peloponnesian War towards the spreading of hostilities to new geographic areas. Other states pursued the policy, though less thoroughly. Two related themes run through the strategic history of the Peloponnesian War, prominent in Thucydide's account but not always sufficiently emphasised by modern scholars: that of exploiting an enemy's weakness and that of stasis. Thucydides describes the Athenians, pressing their advantage after the victory on Sphakteria: 'exploiting their current good fortune, they expected nothing to stand in their way'. During the Peloponnesian War both great powers played to their own strengths with a degree of self-discipline greater than Thucydides gives credit for, in his generalisations.
