The Mediterranean Naval Balance

The outbreak of the First World War was at first something of an anticlimax in the Mediterranean. Naval competition had been intense, rivalled only by that of the British and Germans in the North Sea and when the war began everyone assumed a naval battle would occur within a few days. This did not happen largely due to the decision of the Italian government to remain neutral which resulted in, at least on paper, a lopsided advantage for the Triple Entente. The fact that the Italian decision weighed so heavily was due less to Italy’s inherent strength and more to changing strategic circumstances, notably the preoccupation of Great Britain with the rise of German naval power in the North Sea, coupled with a steady reduction of the British Mediterranean Fleet. At the same time Italy and Austria-Hungary imitated the other powers in the construction of the most powerful class of warships, dreadnoughts, while the development of the French fleet was slowed by political difficulties. Italy and Austria were traditional enemies, but also allies in the Triple Alliance. Their naval building was to a large extent directed against each other but the decline of British power eventually raised the possibility that an Austro-Italian combination might be able to gain control of the sea from the French and whatever British forces remained in the Mediterranean. ¹ There was always something rather artificial about this as with similar paper calculations, but a closer look at the balance of power in the Mediterranean on the eve of the war explains how it could occur.