Northern States, their problem was to resist conquest. In other words, to tire the Federals out, and force them to abandon the war. Its solution depended on how long their resources would hold out, and, in order to add to them, it was vital to maintain contact with Europe, which demanded that the main ports in the Confederacy should be kept open. On the other hand, the Federals could only hope to conquer

the Confederacy bit by bit, that is reduce it systematically, not only in size but also in resources, until it was unable to sustain its armies in the field. At the outset of the war this was realized by the Federal Commander-in-Chief, LieutenantGeneral Winfield Scott (1786-1866), who appreciated the relationship between economic pressure and attack. His project was to seal up all Southern ports, and simultaneously form two powerful armies, one to move down the Mississippi and cut off the western half of the Confederacy from its eastern half, while the other threatened Richmond and pinned down the main Confederate forces in Virginia. Of the Confederate ports, nine were linked to the interior

by rail, and all of these, except Mobile, Charleston and Wil­ mington, were in Federal hands by April, 1862. Of the three which were not, Wilmington was of incalculable importance to the Confederacy, in fact it may be said to have been its mouth; nevertheless, it was not occupied by the Federals until 15th January 1865 - a first-rate blunder. Scott’s other proposals were not adopted until late in the war; instead the main battles

appreciate that the only means open to him to prevent the conquest of the Confederacy were, while he husbanded its resources, to hold the Federals back. This demanded a defen­ sive strategy, but instead he adopted an offensive one, and attempted at one and the same time to protect Richmond and drive the Federals out of the war by a series of battles aimed at the occupation of Washington. Yet both geography and communications indicated that early in the war the most effective way to protect Richmond was to base a powerful army on Chattanooga, and carry out a defensive-offensive campaign in Tennessee, while a less powerful army covered the capital. A vigorous campaign in Tennessee would almost certainly have drawn Federal forces out of Virginia to meet it, and simultaneously have directly protected the vital railway hub Chattanooga-Atlanta, as well as indirectly the important crossing of the Mississippi at Vicksburg. Although something like this was attempted in a muddled way, because the preser­ vation of the Confederacy depended more on husbanding resources than on winning battles, to seek them in Virginia was to squander staying-power. Not until the opening of 1863 was Scott’s project fully1

resorted to by General Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885) who, on 30th January, opened his campaign against Vicksburg. On 4th July the fortress surrendered to him, and the result was that the western half of the Confederacy was severed from its eastern half. Next, by his victory at Chattanooga, on 24th-27th November, Grant opened the road to Atlanta, with the result that the Confederacy was virtually reduced to Virginia, the two Carolinas and Georgia. Lastly, while in the summer of 1864 Grant held the main Confederate army, under Robert E. Lee (1807-1870), around Richmond, General William T. Sherman (1820-1891) moved forward from Chattanooga, occupied Atlanta on 1st September, and from there marched