ABSTRACT
The intracategorical framework is especially promising to CRF scholars because it validates the reality of racism as it intersects with sexism and other social categories of difference (e.g.heterosexism;classism) in the everyday lives of women of color. However, Yuval-Davis, while producing a list of possible differences (potentially incomplete) that includes ‘‘‘race’/skin color; ethnicity; nation/ state; class, culture; ability; age; sedentariness/origin; wealth; North-South; religion, stage of social development’’ (202), asks if it is even conceivable to address all these possible social categories intersecting with a common master category (e.g. race or gender) at any given time? Do some differences acquire greater prominence than others (e.g. sexuality)? Are some ‘‘other’’ differences just added on to merely complicate and ‘‘nuance’’ this intersectional analysis (e.g. disability)? If the intracategorical framework rejects
merely tacking on another difference to its litany of categories (e.g. disability), it would have to, ineffect, reject theadditiveapproach to multiple differences and instead utilize what Yuval-Davis has described as the constitutive approach to multiple differences. This approach, while foregrounding the actual experiences of women of color at the intersection ofmultiple social categories, also describes the structural conditions within which these social categories are constructed by, and intermeshed with each other in specific historical contexts. McCall calls this third approach to theorizing intersectionality the intercategorical framework. Yuval-Davis explains:
Therefore, rather than merely adding disability to nuance an intersectional analysis, we will foreground the historical contexts and structural conditions within which the identity categories of race and disability intersect.
