ABSTRACT
This chapter investigates the prospects of articulating a metaphysical account of the relationship of nothing over and aboveness that physicalism requires. For most proponents of physicalism, however, physicalism is not just ontology; it is also, and importantly so, metaphysics. Fixing, as a pattern of dependence between the physical and the non-physical, remains silent on the precise nature of the metaphysical relationship between the two. Matters do not get any better when we move from fixing to supervenience. There are important differences between entailment and the metaphysical relationship that is presumed to hold between the physical and the non-physical and which renders the first fundamental. Daniel Stoljar's objection notwithstanding, realization physicalism carries the promise of giving rise to the sought-after relationship of metaphysical dependence. Subset realization is revealed as a form of identity physicalism and as such, it is a flat view. Finally, physical realization is hyperintensional insofar as it is more fine-grained than necessitation.
