ABSTRACT
This chapter addresses the argument from subjectivity and the argument from intersubjectivity. Whereas the argument from subjectivity argues that consciousness cannot be physically explained because of the subjective/objective distinction, the argument from intersubjectivity aims to establish the same conclusion by utilizing a different distinction. It should be clear that, in order for the existence of the gap to be a cause of concern for physicalists, it must be a permanent feature of all physical-istically acceptable theoretical attempts to understand consciousness. The belief that the explanatory gap is permanent is widespread in the literature on physicalism and specifically, in writings that purport either to object to physicalism or to showcase its limitations. If the explanatory gap can be bridged only if truths about consciousness are shown to be logically or conceptually connected to truths about its physical nature, then the absence of such connections is evidence for the claim that the gap cannot, even in principle, be bridged.
