ABSTRACT
This chapter offers an explanation for the apparent uniqueness of consciousness that is fully compatible with research program physicalism. It argues that perception of consciousness' uniqueness is the result of basic features of human psychology. The chapter shares with a popular defense of physicalism within analytic metaphysics referred to as "the Phenomenal Concept Strategy". It also offers support for the contention by considering the nature of the authors conceptual capacities when thinking about physicalist explanations of consciousness. The chapter argues that bridging the explanatory gap does not require that consciousness cease to appear other than physical. Psychological attitudes toward consciousness have often been cited as reasons to doubt the prospects of physicalism. The chapter argues that physicalism should be understood as a research program and thus the success of physicalism cannot be determined in advance and on the basis of theoretical grounds. It provides a positive argument for the veracity of physicalism nor to respond to conceivability arguments against physicalism.
