On its own, we have argued, China is at present hardly an attractive or sufficiently differentiated alternative to the US (neo)liberal world order, beyond some quarters of the developing word. Neither is it likely to try exporting its model at full-throttle any time soon – both because of geo-politics and because of its narrative of non-interventionism. Consequently, a convergence of power and interests between the anti-globalisation New Left in the West and Chinese officialdom seems unlikely for now. Nationalism is perhaps the last tier of CPC legitimacy, but it is not least. Its advancement in the economic realm, almost by definition, means rejection of neoliberalism. We note three key features of the Chinese variant of the developmental state: the maintenance of a large SOE sector, high inequality and incredible receptivity to FDI. Only the last two features are congruent with neoliberalism, and even so – they are likely to be assiduously kept constant if not abate over the next decade. China‘s current efforts to groom nominally privately owned technological “national champions”, like Huawei and Lenovo, for global primacy is reminiscent of policies in all other East Asian developmental states and may betoken less acceptance of foreign ownership in the future.