ABSTRACT
In this chapter I develop a largely non-empirical case for the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism. To do so, I begin by criticizing what I take to be the standard construal of the relationship between transcendental phenomenology and naturalism. I then defend a ‘minimal’ version of phenomenology that is compatible with liberal naturalism in the ontological register (but incompatible with scientific naturalism) and is also compatible with weak forms of methodological naturalism, the latter of which is understood as advocating ‘results continuity’ with the relevant empirical sciences over the long haul. Rather than such a trajectory amounting to a Faustian pact in which phenomenology sacrifices its soul, I contend that insofar as phenomenologists care about challenging reductive versions of naturalism, the best way for this to be done is via the impure and hybridic account of phenomenology I outline here.
