ABSTRACT
WHEN the British Government informed the United Nations that, as they could not accept any decision on the future of Palestine which had not been agreed by both Jews and Arabs, they could not take any part in the implementing of the partition plan they were being politically consistent and possibly politically honest. But they can have had no idea what chaos this decision would cause and what difficulties for themselves and their unfortunate representatives it would entail: nor can they have appreciated the ignominy it would earn them, particularly as they were rash enough to add that they would of course be responsible for the maintenance of public security until, with the termination of the Mandate, their responsibility lapsed. In fact it became increasingly difficult to maintain any kind of real security, even in the rapidly dwindling areas in which the Government's forces were confined. Gradually Jews and Arabs, with the helpless, tacit approval of the Government, established their own security measures in the respective areas in which they were in the majority, and it was in the mixed and border districts that fighting continued right until the end of the Mandate, despite desperate efforts by the British authorities to maintain a semblance of order. The Palestine Government quite reasonably refused a tongue in the cheek offer by the Jewish Agency that they should be officially responsible for the maintenance of order in predominantly Jewish areas. This would have given Hagana legal status and would anyhow have been tantamount to acceptance of the partition decision. In effect, however, Hagana did take over in Tel Aviv and other Jewish towns and, after a few more weeks, in the Jewish districts of Jerusalem as well. As the Mandate drew to an end, Jewish aggression increased in step with frantic Jewish efforts to build up their forces and to make certain of a number of strategic positions for the coming fight with the Arabs. Jewish anxiety was great, for they were, too, to some extent deceived by the boastful claims of Arab military strength and by some Arab attacks on their lines of communication. The Arabs on the other hand, despite a good deal of sporadic and on the whole singularly light-hearted guerilla activity mainly by the bands that were by now infiltering across the northern and eastern frontiers, took no concerted action; the official reason was that the Arabs did not wish to be involved in any open conflict with the British.
