Aftermath and Legacy
DOI link for Aftermath and Legacy
Aftermath and Legacy book
In Chapter 1 I discussed the views of some of Wittgenstein’s philosophical predecessors concerning thought and will, bringing out various problems inherent in those views. Among these problems were: (i) that of giving a satisfactory answer to Parmenides’s challenge, “How is false thought (or unfulfi lled intention) possible?”; (ii) that of explaining how an inner item (thought, volition, idea . . .) could represent anything; (iii) that of explaining a person’s authority concerning her thoughts and intentions. In considering these problems we encountered attempted solutions, further problems, seeming dead ends. Wittgenstein’s views about thought and will were expounded in the last three chapters, views which evolved during the course of his life. His mature position can be seen to have coped with or avoided the diffi culties attaching to the traditional accounts, in various ways. The notions of “intrinsic” representation, of an inner state, of introspective knowledge, as also of merely causal relations holding between intention and fulfi lment or thought and fact, are all examined and criticised by Wittgenstein. So are more general underlying philosophical tendencies, such as the tendency to see the single or essential function of “psychological” statements as being that of ascribing mental states . In place of the notions and pictures that have been attacked Wittgenstein gives us a complex and multifaceted account, in which are stressed such things as the point of (certain of) our language-games, often in terms of the sort of creature we are, i.e. human beings.