ABSTRACT
This chapter explains the special form of scepticism, the philosophical activity and view known as Pyrrhonism. The decisive thing to note is that the only extant work by a Greek sceptic is that of Sextus Empiricus. Psychologically, scepticism must be considered a stable disposition, even if a momentary state of mind may hide it and even be inconsistent with it. Thus, a phlegmatic man may become momentarily agitated, a mild man succumb to anger. The close connection between twentieth-century empiricism and Sextus's Pyrrhonism is obvious. But it is unfair to portray Sextus as a supporter of any kind of doctrine that authors have knowledge only of appearances or of what is immediately given in experience. A number of primitivisms, anti- or ir-rationalisms are compatible. And because the sceptic has intimate relations with a particular culture and tradition, deep cultural differences will affect him.
