ABSTRACT
Professor Arthur Pap calls attention to the fact that critics of the regularity theory of causation have more than once pointed out that two events may be 'constantly conjoined' without being causally connected, but have mostly been silent to an alternative analysis of the concept of causation. The author believes that Pap criticisms of the analysis of Causality make the words 'cause' and 'effect' applicable only to concrete events. This restriction constitutes not a defect but a virtue of that analysis, for it is a requirement which any correct analysis of Causality would have to satisfy. The truth is, on the contrary, that every state of affairs that exists, is fully concrete, no matter of what kinds that state of affairs and that change in it may respectively be instances. The statements of causal laws, which are what enable us to control or to anticipate events, can be interpreted without difficulty in terms of his analysis of Causality.
