ABSTRACT
Having shown that the equation of knowledge with perception cannot be defended https://s3-euw1-ap-pe-df-pch-content-public-p.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/9781315694740/4cca3edf-e515-4bd0-9c2c-7c7b69d7080f/content/pg118_1_B.tif" xmlns:xlink="https://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"/> (183c 2–3), Plato turns at last to consider the merits of the equation in its pure state, without admixture of Heracleiteanism. The conclusion of his argument (186e 9–10) leaves no doubt that in his view perception, with or without the aid of Heracleitean metaphysics, cannot be equated with knowledge. But in the interpretation of the argument by which he reaches this conclusion, as we have seen is also the case in the interpretation of his refutation of Heracleiteanism itself, there are enormously wide divergences of opinion. 1
