ABSTRACT
In the course of his refutation of Theaetetus’ first attempt at a definition of knowledge, Socrates reaches the conclusion that knowledge must reside not in mere perceptual awareness–mere https://s3-euw1-ap-pe-df-pch-content-public-p.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/9781315694740/4cca3edf-e515-4bd0-9c2c-7c7b69d7080f/content/pg141_1_B.tif" xmlns:xlink="https://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"/> but in the reasoning we do on the basis of our experience (186d 2–5). As I argued above this in fact suggests an account of empirical knowledge which takes Plato far beyond the old over-simple dichotomy, found in the Republic, between knowledge concerned with the Forms and (mere) belief about empirical matters. In the sequel, however, we find Plato disappointingly not pursuing this suggestion; instead Theaetetus takes up a hint prepared for him by Socrates and proposes as a new definition that knowledge is identical with true reasoning or true belief https://s3-euw1-ap-pe-df-pch-content-public-p.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/9781315694740/4cca3edf-e515-4bd0-9c2c-7c7b69d7080f/content/pg141_2_B.tif" xmlns:xlink="https://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"/>. This definition is hardly more promising than the one just disposed of, and in fact when Socrates at length (201a–c) undertakes to test its adequacy, he is able to refute it with as much ease as one would expect: obviously some true judgments are made by luck or by guessing or in some other way fail to display knowledge of the matters at hand.
