ABSTRACT
The last section of the Theaetetus (201c 7–210b 3) examines a fresh definition of knowledge. The preceding discussion has shown that true judgment by itself cannot be knowledge, and it occurs to Theaetetus that the old definition is not so much wrong as over-inclusive: knowledge might be defined as true belief or judgment restricted in some way. He remembers having heard it said that knowledge is true belief (judgment) accompanied by https://s3-euw1-ap-pe-df-pch-content-public-p.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/9781315694740/4cca3edf-e515-4bd0-9c2c-7c7b69d7080f/content/pg234_1_B.tif" xmlns:xlink="https://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"/> (account, explanation, etc.), and this definition now seems to him a plausible suggestion. In order to put it to work, however, one would have to know more about what might be meant by logos in this context. In the subsequent discussion and examination, therefore, four efforts are made to give a precise sense to this notion; but in each case the concrete definition which results is rejected. Here the matter is dropped: there seems to be nothing beyond the four explanations of logos proposed by Socrates which the person whose theory Theaetetus has adopted might have meant by saying that knowledge is true belief plus logos. The dialogue thereupon closes with a declaration of defeat: knowledge is neither perception nor true belief nor the latter together with logos, and no further likely candidate suggests itself.
