ABSTRACT
It seems to me there exist some bona fide asymmetric features o f our self-referential speech devices, which may themselves be related to the troublesome asymmetry between self ascriptions and other-ascriptions: related, that is, to Scepticism about Persons. I want to show, however, that these asymmetric features o f the first person are due to our convened capitaliza tion, with great economic results, upon certain interesting aspects o f the speech situation. Hence, these asymmetric feat ures o f our first-personal device, I hope to show, are not sufficient to mark a systematic distinction; and if they are not so sufficient it will be at least more difficult to argue that firstperson ascriptions differ in some systematic way from otherperson ascriptions. That argument would seem to require that the asymmetries o f our self-referential devices with respect to our other demonstratives be more than a matter o f economic contingency.1
