ABSTRACT
Although we may feel the sceptic’s asymmetrical scaling o f selves and others is somehow askew, as in section 18, we do reject with less hesitancy a perhaps more basic measure o f his. That measure is the epistemological one that in some sense I am licensed to say certain things o f myself such that the same license is denied me should I say these things o f another. I have argued that even should we accept this we need not accept the separation off o f the first person unless, as is fantastic, we are to accept equally the symmetrical separation o f all three persons. W$ may accept as a canon that the first, second, and third person roles must all be fully interchangeable roles with out any residual ‘personal’ tradings as far as the functions o f the roles themselves are concerned. But I want anyway now to examine the epistemological root o f the first person asymmetry since the reductio which results in accepting fully its conse quences serves only as a symptom that all is not being said as it should be said.
