ABSTRACT
This paper will attempt to show that qualities and properties are very different sort of entities, and that a neglect of the difference between them is in large measure responsible for the persistence of the controversy between idealism and realism. The term 'material things' will be used to refer to such entities as the tables, trees, books, houses, animals, minerals, mountains, rivers, etc., by which we are surrounded in the view of common sense, and the assumption of common sense also will be made, that we can well enough for ordinary purposes identify a place in space by pointing to it. Although the problem of the meaning of the terms 'space', 'time', and 'material thing' is raised by the views to be presented, no attempt to deal with it can be made within the limits of the present paper. I
In philosophical discussions, such simple statements as 'This tree is green', 'The table in my study is brown', etc., are frequently used as examples of information, obtained by perception, concerning attributes of material things. The present discussion will take as a starting point the statement 'This tree is green', and will be throughout largely worded in the terms of this particular statement. While this procedure may at first appear to entail some loss
* The Journal of Philosophy, vol. XXXI, No. 3, 1934· 1 The writer, however, has elsewhere outlined the sort of analysis of the
of generality, it will have the great advantage of minimizing ambiguity and the consequent risk of misunderstanding. In the next two main divisions of this paper, two radically different senses, one or the other of which appears sufficient in all cases to interpret the assertion 'This tree is green', will be examined. And in the fourth main division, the bearing of the distinctions established upon the contentions of realism and idealism will be considered.
