In the aftermath of the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, the Western powers saw their influence over Middle Eastern leaders and governments decline sharply. With the entry of the Soviet Union as an active player in the region, Egypt seemed to be on the verge of having 'both arms and the [ Aswan] dam', 1 the latter either from a Western consortium or from the Soviet Union. In the regional balance of power, the Israelis felt the improvement of Nasir's bargaining position most acutely. Seen from Tel Aviv, Gamal Abd al-Nasir appeared in mid-November to be 'getting everything he wanted'. He was, a senior IMFA official complained, 'getting his arms from the Soviet Union, the High Aswan Dam from the US and now Eden had come along and offered him slices of Israel's territory. '2 Reflecting the widespread fears of the Israeli public, Acting Foreign Minister Golda Myerson questioned Nasir's motives and sincerity in claiming to desire a settlement. 'His real aim', she affirmed to the US Charge d'affaires in Tel Aviv, 'was the destruction of Israel, and a settlement which gave him part of the Negev would be nothing more than a first step in the achievement of this aim.' Myerson went on to express her astonishment that the British could support territorial contiguity between Egypt and Jordan, given new evidence that 'Nasser was already trying to subvert Jordan against Great Britain[ ... A] land link would simply make his task easier.'3