ABSTRACT
This chapter talks about how court-induced quasi-rights influence the reactions of legislatures and the behaviours of administrative agencies. The main contribution of rights-based budgeting is that it gives people more details on how budget decision makers behave under institutional procedures. Court-induced quasi-rights shed light on how budget decision makers exert their discretion, sometimes detailed than and different from what incrementalism predicted. Executive agencies may not decline to comply with the court decisions on the grounds that they do not have adequate resources and as a result, budgets for the litigated programs are expected to grow. But executive agencies do not simply comply with the court decisions as mandated, which interest's budget. In addition, when court decisions mandate executive agencies to redress unfair and cruel and unusual treatment of individuals, executive agencies are supposed to comply with these decisions. This phenomenon is widely known as rights-based budgeting, it tends to significantly modify the stable and predictable process in budgetary incrementalism.
