ABSTRACT

The preferred-freedoms doctrine holds that some constitutionally protected freedoms, particularly those contained in the First Amendment are so fundamental in a free society that they require greater judicial protection than other constitutional provisions. Justice Stone discounted his own role and suggested that others laid the foundation for the preferred- freedoms doctrine. Justice Wiley B. Rutledge stated for the Court in Murdock that "freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion is in a preferred position". The phrase "preferred freedom" is infrequently used, but the underlying sentiment remains operative. The fullest elaboration of the preferred-freedoms doctrine came in Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516, which involved a state restriction on labor- organizing activities. Henry Abraham and Barbara Perry suggested that the doctrine embraces a judicial "double standard" in applying a higher level of scrutiny to cases in the "cultural/noneconomic/civil rights/civil libertarian category than in the economic proprietarian one".